Migrations and the Arab Spring – a new security nexus?

Abstract

The Mediterranean is a unique geopolitical region long known for its instability and conflicts. The Arab democratic wave that since 2011 has swept the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries places new challenges to the region’s security. Transitions are far from complete and the outcomes of the Arab Spring are still uncertain, as the political scene remains volatile. The political and social instability in the southern shore increased human mobility within the region and pressure in the South-North axe of the Mediterranean. It has triggered two major refugee crises in the EU’s southern neighborhood and increased fear of massive flows to Europe. The EU responded by increasing control in its external borders and by adopting other restrictive measures. In this context, the EU’s role in

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the creation of a true area of peace and stability around the Mediterranean Sea is fundamental. The security interdependence between both shores of the Mediterranean is undeniable. Therefore, the EU must adopt an active position and rethink its cooperation model towards the region. It is the aim of this paper to (a) get an integrated perspective of the main security challenges in the Mediterranean; (b) explore the Mediterranean migratory patterns after the upheavals and assess whether they represent a challenge to European security; (c) analyze the Arab Spring’s impact in the Euro-Mediterranean relations; and (d) assess the Mediterranean as a security complex, while identifying the challenges that the EU's foreign policy faces in the region.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Security, Migration, Euro-Mediterranean Relations

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A Overview

The year of 2011 represents a turning point for the Arab societies. After decades of oppression, the social uprisings in the Arab world challenged the old system and aim to move towards a state funded on the values of freedom, justice, and human dignity. Thus, the so-called Arab Spring represents an historical moment for the region.

Countries in the Southern Mediterranean shore face different levels of development. Furthermore, the region has been marked by decades of corruption and mismanagement, which has affected its economic, political and social development.

Although there is an increasing convergence of the medium levels of the Human Development Index within the Mediterranean (Table 1), internal inequalities are still a reality. Demography is an important variable in the development of the region and there are great discrepancies between both shores. Demographic development patterns are the result of the interaction between different variables – socio-economic, political, religious, educational, and others. Courbage considers education to be the socioeconomic factor that mostly influences fertility.\(^2\) This along with feminine emancipation and access to education are catalysts of the modern demographic development standards in the Arab world.

In the North, child mortality rates are decreasing along with fertility rates, while life expectancy age has increased. The population is progressively older, which questions these countries’ demographic evolution, economic development and life quality maintenance, among others. In fact, European countries are facing a demographic challenge due to its aging population, lack of active work force and declining fertility rates. With an aging population, Europe will face a shortage of labour force, jeopardizing the countries’ wealth production. Furthermore, the drastic

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Table 1: Human Development Index
population aging will shake the current social systems, which might destroy the welfare state.³

Without migrations Europe will start shrinking (projections indicate that by the year 2050 there will be 448 million inhabitants against the 506 million in 2010). Therefore migrations are a key to demographic growth in the Northern shore.⁴ In fact, migratory dynamics have already contributed to maintain positive levels in the North, by increasing fertility rates and working age population.⁵

In the South, the urbanization of population is a positive demographic trend. One should remember that the decrease in child mortality and fertility rates is connected with the urban phenomenon. The urban exodus contributes to the economic and social development of states, as citizens have greater access to health care, education, sanitation and even to local power. Nonetheless, the asymmetries in the distribution of population, that prefer the urban centers, are a potential source of instability. The creation of ghettos and the consequent social exclusion, along with the lack of infrastructures and adequate means to accommodate large volumes of people can, in extremis, lead to ethnic and religious conflicts. Thus, the association between urban growth and conflicts comes from the incapacity of governments and local authorities to create mechanisms

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⁴ P. Fargues (2012), 18.
that favors the integration of these communities in society and labor market.⁶

In addition, the population is increasingly more educated. The growing access of young people to education and the new role of women in the Arab society are slowly changing the patriarchal systems of these societies. We now have a generation with different goals and ideals that challenges the patriarchal system in charge. However, education is not a synonym for guaranteed job. The labour market in these countries has not been able to absorb all the human resources available.⁷ The increasing unemployment among young people in the Southern Mediterranean proves exactly that (Table 2).

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Table 2: Youth unemployment rates, by region (2000-2016)


⁷ S. S. Ferreira, Re-thinking the Euro-Mediterranean Relations after the Arab Spring, Thinking Out of the Box: Devising New European Policies to Face the Arab Spring (NEPAS), Braga, 2014 (in press).
Southern countries face a youth bulge, as more than 40% of the adults are young people between the ages of 15-29. These are countries with a very young population, due to decades of fast population growth. Thus, in the South the demographic dynamic is very positive, despite a slowdown in the medium growth rhythms (Table 3).

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<td>609</td>
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Migrations and the Arab Spring

The fact that these states neither have the capacity to absorb all the labor force in their labor market available nor they have the necessary resources (economic and logistic) to create more jobs, is source of discontentment among the youth and fuse to social and political tension. Moreover, salaries are very low and there is a lack of opportunities for qualified young people. Fargues considers that this situation “sets the stage for widespread frustration among the young, which in turn may lead to resignation, rebellion or emigration”.\(^9\)

Both shores have different life standards which deepens the gap between them. The Arab world is facing a turning point focusing more on the individual’s freedoms, which sets the stage for a paradigm shift.

The instability created by the Arab Spring has accentuated these cleavages and created new challenges. It is the purpose of this paper to (a) get an integrated perspective of the main security challenges in the Mediterranean; (b) explore the Mediterranean migratory patterns after the upheavals and assess whether they represent a challenge to European security; (c) analyze the Arab Spring’s impact in the Euro-Mediterranean relations; and (d) assess the Mediterranean as a security complex, while identifying the challenges that the EU’s foreign policy faces in the region. In addressing these topics, this article aims to assess if migration in the Mediterranean, following the Arab Spring, placed a new security challenge to the region, especially to the EU.

B Security Challenges in the Mediterranean

Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in 2011 have focused the international community’s attention in the MENA region and brought new light to the importance of the Euro-Mediterranean relations.

The movement for change that started in the streets aimed to overthrow the authoritarian regimes established and make way for a new era based upon the values of “democratic governance, social justice and decent employment”.\(^\text{10}\) Discontentment among people (due to

\(^{10}\) UNDP, Arab Development Challenges Report 2011 – Towards the Developmental State in the Arab Region, Cairo, 2011, at 1.
unemployment, precarious social situations, lack of opportunities and others) and the constant violation of human rights by the regimes triggered the Arab Spring, a new time of high expectations.

Countries in the MENA region are at different stages. In some countries there has been an effective overthrow of the regimes (as in Tunisia and Egypt), in others the regimes established have tried to avoid uprisings by making swift constitutional changes (take Morocco and Jordan for example), others are still facing contestation (e.g. Syria).

The outcomes of the Arab Spring are still uncertain and rely on the choices of the people. History shows that “revolutions tend to be followed by years, and sometimes decades, of instability”.11 Moreover, the possibility of an “Arab Winter” is still open. If the new established regimes fail to achieve the demands requested by the people or if fundamentalist Islamist regimes are established a new dark moment may fall upon the region (take Egypt for example). Most of the new leaders are inexperienced and they will have to deal with a myriad of problems and demands in order to implement democratic states based on the values of justice, social cohesion and respect for human rights.

High expectations surround the Arab Spring but steps must be taken carefully thought. The UNDP suggests that it should “start with pragmatic measures to reach the minimum acceptable level of employment and growth that will provide a stable economic environment to enable democratic transition and sustainable long-term development”.12

The political and social upheavals of the Arab Spring and its aftermath challenge regional and international security. The political instability of the region affects its neighboring countries as well as its (economic and political) partners. Yet, it created a unique political opportunity namely for the EU, which can play an important role in the promotion of democracy and in the demand for freedom and dignity.

The political instability has also had a negative impact on the economies of the region, as many economic sectors have disintegrated. The region, which already had high unemployment rates, now faces a huge unemployment challenge in terms of job creation, vulnerable employment and low salaries. The UNDP indicates that “to address the employment challenge Arab countries would need to adopt more accommodating macroeconomic and sectorial policies”\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, a sustainable management of environmental resources is essential, as it is one of the most serious challenges in terms of development these countries face. Water scarcity is a huge problem in the region and climate change has a severe impact with episodes of drought, which jeopardize agriculture and food production, thus contributing to poverty and international migration. The Southern Mediterranean is one of the most vulnerable regions to climate change. The intensification of environmental phenomena, such as scarcity of natural resources, soil erosion and desertification (among others), has “severe effects on key sectors of the economy (e.g. agriculture, tourism, food prices)”\textsuperscript{14} and raises environmental security challenges.

\textsuperscript{13} UNDP (2011), 6.
\textsuperscript{14} European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Supporting closer
Despite the democratic and socio-economic reforms, there are also global and transnational threats challenging the region, as highlighted by the EU.\textsuperscript{15} Terrorism and international crime are one of the main concerns in the region for they increase instability. International networks operating in North Africa place risks and threats to the Mediterranean region as a whole.

The upheavals have highlighted challenges concerning migration.\textsuperscript{16} The instability caused by the Arab Spring has triggered two major refugee crises and has also increased irregular migrations in the Mediterranean. The factors that set off the conflicts (unemployment and social inequalities) are also at the core of migratory movements. Migration, namely South-North migration, is thus often the main focus in Mediterranean relations in terms of security.\textsuperscript{17}

\section*{C Migratory dynamics before and after the Arab Spring}

The Mediterranean is a unique geopolitical region and plays an essential role in international migration as it is the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{15} JOIN (2012) 36 final, 3-5.
\textsuperscript{17} For more on the migration-security nexus see: S. S. Ferreira, Imigração. Uma ameaça securitária para a Europa?, Jornal de Defesa e Relações Internacional, 2013, http://database.jornaldefesa.pt/geopolitica/JDRI%202012%20202101 13%20imigra%C3%A7%C3%A3o.pdf (7 July 2013).
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crossroad between one of the regions with greater mobility (Africa) and one of the most sought host regions (Europe). The region has a complex migratory network with South-North mobility (Maghreb-Europe), South-South mobility (from Libya to Tunisia and Egypt and from the Maghreb countries to the Persian Gulf) and East-West mobility (from the Balkans and Turkey to Western Europe).\(^\text{18}\)

The Arab Spring has increased fear of large-scale migrations to Europe and exacerbated the feeling of insecurity among Europeans, due to its geographical proximity. Immigration as a threat to the Mediterranean results from the feeling of insecurity regarding migratory flows from North Africa, particularly from the Maghreb, and often challenges human security, as migrants risk their own lives in the search for a better one. However, a recent study from Fargues and Fandrich has concluded that “migration to Europe has not been accelerated by the Arab Spring, apart from a short-lived movement from Tunisia, but has simply continued along previous trends”\(^\text{19}\).

Immigration from southern Mediterranean countries to Europe has been a reality for several decades now (Figure 1 and Table 4). In 2010 almost 8 million migrants came from Mediterranean Arab countries, from which 62% were living in EU member states.\(^\text{20}\)

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\(^\text{19}\) P. Fargues/C. Fandrich (2012).

\(^\text{20}\) P. Fargues/C. Fandrich (2012), 1.
Figure 1: Migrants stocks from selected Arab countries in OECD countries in 2001 and 2010 - By country of origin

According to official data from CARIM, since the year 2000 there has been an increase in the number of migrants from North Africa to Europe. Morocco has been the largest contributor, and in Spain between 2006 and 2007 there has been an increase of 13.2% Moroccans (71,397 individuals). Still, the greatest migrant group from the Mediterranean in Europe are Turks.\(^{21}\)

Migration from the South has been triggered by feelings of frustration between young people, due to lack of opportunities (unemployment, low payments, and authoritarian regimes, among others). Such scenarios accentuate South-North migratory pressure. Nevertheless, one should regard migration “as the strongest bridge between the two contrasted shores of the Mediterranean”. But does the EU perceive migration as a regional bridge? We will further develop this question in the next section, when analyzing the Euro-Mediterranean relations and dialogue.

Countries at the Mediterranean coast are often simultaneously countries of origin, transit and destination, which can change depending on the different fluxes and the routes taken. South-South mobility is mainly triggered by economic motivations and political conflicts. By the end of 2010 around 4.5 million immigrants were living in Arab Mediterranean countries, both in regular and irregular situations.

South-South mobility has occurred mostly between migrant workers (mainly to the countries which are oil producers). Countries in the MENA region are an important destination for millions of workers. Libya has, until recently, been the largest migrant-receiver in the region, although this migrants situation has never been stable. Take Egypt for instance with a recent migratory history and that has always had Libya as its main country of destination.

The political and social tensions of the Arab Spring have shaken these states economies and have changed migratory patterns and challenged regional security. The

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increased volatility of the region has accentuated the migratory pressure. According to Fargues and Fandrich’s report, South-South mobility has increased as people fled their countries to find shelter in neighbor countries.26 Thus, more than an increase in South-North migration, as exacerbated by the media, the Arab Spring had a deep impact in migrations within the Southern Mediterranean (Figure 2).

Frontex’ report from the last quarter of 2011 indicates that there has been an increase in irregular migration (irregular sea and land border crossing), mainly during the second and third quarter of the year.27 However, this increase is not so relevant when compared with previous data. With the beginning of the revolution there was a boost in boat-smuggling from Tunisia and Libya. Between January and September 2011, 42,807 irregular entries by sea were registered in Italy, mainly on the island of Lampedusa.

26 P. Fargues/C. Fandrich (2012).
Fargues and Fandrich consider this to be the result of a window of opportunity created by a deficit in border control in the area, not only for those escaping the revolution but also for other migrants who saw an opportunity to take this route instead of another.  

The political and social unrest in Tunisia and Libya was responsible for fluctuations in the size and composition of the migratory movements in the Central Mediterranean route (Figure 3). Nevertheless, according to Frontex “[t]he increase was almost entirely due to more detections of migrants from Somalia (1,094) combined with a steady stream of migrants still arriving from Tunisia”.

Figure 3: Detection of irregular border crossing by main irregular routes

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Most detections were from Tunisians, Afghans and Algerians, followed by migrants from other nationalities (presumably Sub-Saharan Africans) (Figure 4). A great share of Southern Mediterranean countries are the corridors for regular and irregular routes from Sub-Saharan population and East-Asians. Frequently some of these countries are the final destination for those migrants.

Figure 4: Top ten nationalities detected at external borders (2011-2012)

Irregular migration in the Mediterranean is often a risk to human security as most migrants fall into organized crime networks. In the attempt to cross the Mediterranean by boat over 8 thousand people have lost their lives in the last decade, although real numbers are difficult to estimate and are probably higher.\(^{30}\)

The population fleeing the revolution sought shelter mostly in neighbouring countries, most of them seeking

asylum. The events of the Arab Spring triggered two massive refugee crises in the Southern Mediterranean, Libya and Syria (Figure 5). According to recent data, at least more than one million have fled Libya and Syria. IOM considers that “the 2011 crisis in Libya represented one of the largest migration crises in modern history (…)”. 31


The revolts in Libya and Syria have displaced a considerable part of the population. Both situations have created major humanitarian crises, with unbearable violence, which have concerned the international community. People from Libya fled to Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, Algeria, Chad and Sudan and a smaller percentage to Italy and Malta. Refugees from Syria were accepted in Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and also Iraq. 32 UNHCR along with local NGOs and the receiving states has played an

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31 IOM (2012), 19.
32 P. Fargues/C. Fandrich (2012), 4-11.
important role in managing this crisis. Still, the outcome of the situation in Syria is unpredictable and remains volatile.

The upheavals in Europe's neighborhood challenge European security and question Europe's capacity to find its voice in times of crisis. At the same time it points out the need to rethink the EU's approach to the Mediterranean region. Thus, how has the EU managed the crisis?

D Managing the crisis – Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and partnership

So far, Euro-Mediterranean relations have been marked by ups and downs, due to internal and external factors that conditioned the relations between Mediterranean countries. Moreover, there are priority divergences between both shores of the Mediterranean; while southern countries focus on issues of co-development and common dialogue, the northern ones focus on migratory fluxes control and managing irregular migration.  

Thus, migration and security have always been at the top of the EU's Mediterranean agenda. The Arab Spring, however, created a unique political opportunity to the Mediterranean region and to Euro-Mediterranean relations. With the break of the upheavals in the Southern Mediterranean, the EU and most of its member states focused their attention in the development of the region.  

In March 2011 the European

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33 S. S. Ferreira (2013), 9.
34 The Development-Security nexus “(…) can be understood as a dispositif or ‘constellation of institutions, practices, and beliefs that create conditions of possibility within a particular field’ […].
Commission launched a communication entitled “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean countries”, which calls for a new approach to the region, based on more differentiation (*more-for-more*). Thus, “those that go further and faster with reforms will be able to count on greater support from the EU”.  

According to this communication, the EU’s immediate responses to the uprisings were in terms of financial support for humanitarian aid; increase in border control, with Frontex joint operations; support for democratic transition; facilitation of consular cooperation and evacuation and visits to the field (Tunisia and Egypt) by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.  

In order to support the democratic reform the EU made its expertise available and called upon a greater role from civil society organizations and NGOs. Moreover, the EU started “supporting public administration reform aimed at streamlining and strengthening of basic policy processes, budget formulation and the capacity to raise domestic funding through efficient, fair and sustainable tax systems and administrations”.  

The nexus constitutes a field of development and security actors, aid agencies and professional networks, complete with their own forms of subjectivity, that call forth the conditions of need and insecurity to which collectively, and in competition, they seek to provide solutions”. M. Duffield, The Liberal Way of Development and the Development – Security Impasse: Exploring the Global Life-Chance Divide, Security Dialogue, 41 (2010) 1, at 56.  

European Commission, A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern Mediterranean, COM (2011) 200 final, at 5.  


The Commission also called for a review of the European Neighbourhood Policy in order to face the challenges of the changing political landscape in the Mediterranean. With "A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of a European Neighbourhood Policy" the EU aims to "strengthen the partnership between the EU and the countries and societies of the neighbourhood: to build and consolidate healthy democracies, pursue sustainable economic growth and manage cross-border links". It establishes the link between democracy-building and migration. With new stable democratic countries migration will decrease and will be better managed, at least that is the expectation.

Despite the dedication to democracy-building, and the fact that development and migration remain at the top of the agenda in the region, in terms of migration management the EU did not come up with new approaches, instead it "reaffirmed old positions regarding Mediterranean migration". The increased fear of massive flows of irregular immigrants led member states to further strengthen border control. In this regard, Frontex Joint Operation Hermes was set up in February 2011 to monitor the Mediterranean Sea. In terms of regular migration, Mobility Partnerships were launched with partner countries (Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt) and the EU committed to support mobility of students and researchers through university scholarships and Erasmus Mundus.

Even though the refugee flows from Libya did not pose a true challenge to Europe, rather to its neighboring

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38 COM(2011) 200 final, 1.
40 P. Fargues/C. Fandrich (2012), 5.
countries, member states were encouraged to facilitate humanitarian aid and asylum.\textsuperscript{43}

In December 2012 the European Commission released a \textit{Joint Communication} entitled “Supporting closer cooperation and regional integration in the Maghreb: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia”,\textsuperscript{44} aiming to enhance cooperation between the countries of the Maghreb and the EU. It addresses different issues that may support this cooperation, including migration and mobility. Considering that “[m]igration and mobility play a key role in the EU’s relations with the countries of the Maghreb”,\textsuperscript{45} the document enunciates a number of proposals, such as: (1) support legal migration schemes with the Maghreb countries; (2) promote regional cooperation in the field of border control and surveillance and fight against irregular immigration; (3) promote readmission cooperation with countries of origin; and (4), assist the countries of origin in matters of asylum and international protection.

Although the new global context does not favour migration, South-North migration is essential as it contributes to Europe’s demographic dynamic. The demographic cleavages will continue to pressure South-North mobility, along with political instability and the quest for a better life.\textsuperscript{46} Thus, the EU should perceive this situation of complementarity between both shores and focus on managing and promoting circular migration, developing mechanisms to regulate migration that does not jeopardize human security, and focus on the positive effects of migration. Nevertheless, this should be the result of multilateral decisions and not unilateral ones.

\textsuperscript{43} P. Fargues/C. Fandrich (2012), 10.
\textsuperscript{44} JOIN (2012) 36 final, 3-5.
\textsuperscript{45} JOIN (2012) 36 final, 16.
\textsuperscript{46} T. F. Rodrigues/S. S. Ferreira (2011), 33.
E Migration in the Mediterranean – opportunities and challenges

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring the future is still unforeseeable as the outcomes are unpredictable. The instability of the region and the gap between both shores of the Mediterranean have always posed challenges to regional security and contribute to South-North human mobility.

A successful transformation of Southern Mediterranean countries depends on the new development models adopted. Despite the last decade’s improvements, human development in the region is still very low, and people should be at the core of the development process. The creation of an integrated system, that co-relates the political, economic, social and environmental circles, is thus essential.

What are the main security challenges the Mediterranean region now faces? What is the importance and weight of migration in the Euro-Mediterranean security nexus? For a better understanding of the main challenges in the Mediterranean region we created a PESTEL matrix\(^\text{47}\) that allows us to evaluate the external environment through a combination of factors (political, economic, social, technological and environmental) and to characterize the internal environment (Figure 6).

\(^{47}\) More information on PESTEL Analysis, at http://pestel-analysis.com/.
Figure 6: PESTEL exercise
Source: Author’s elaboration.

First of all, I would like to underline the importance of all five factors analyzed; they all have a different impact on the future of the migratory-security nexus in the Mediterranean. The political and social insecurity, along with economic instability in the South, motivates migration and increases fears of large-scale migration to Europe.
Moreover, the Arab Spring has exacerbated the feeling of insecurity among Europeans. The increased volatility of the region has accentuated the migratory pressure and triggered two massive refugee crises in the southern Mediterranean, Libya and Syria. Furthermore, the political and social tensions of the Arab Spring have shaken these states' economies, have changed migration patterns and challenged regional security.  

Climate change is a global phenomenon, which has great impact in the Mediterranean region. Scarcity of natural resources or even natural catastrophes motivate migration. Environmental migration is already a reality in this region and also challenges regional security, as migrants and/or refugees seek shelter in neighboring countries. Furthermore, it may also be a potential source of political conflict over resources.

The EU is currently facing a demographic downturn and migration is the key to this problem. With an aging population and an increasing lack of labor force, migration will contribute to an increase in population, and to maintain the economic system with active labor force. In this regard, we should not forget the South’s youth bulge. As a result, there is a situation of complementarity between both shores, from which both could benefit.

Against common perceptions, the Arab Spring did not cause a massive influx of migration to Europe, the population rather looked for shelter mostly in neighboring countries (South-South migrations). There was a light increase in terms of irregular migration in the first semester of 2011, but nothing significant when compared with previous data. We can therefore conclude that Mediterranean South-North migration is and always will be a reality, due to the existing differences between both shores. Still, not all the north is attractive to those migrants.

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48 S. S. Ferreira (2013).
and not all Mediterranean migration has the northern shore has final destination.\textsuperscript{49}

Immigration as a threat to the Mediterranean results from the feeling of insecurity regarding migratory flows from North Africa, particularly from the Maghreb. The fast demographic growth in North Africa, the slow economic development and the high unemployment rates along with the Arab regimes instability challenge European security. The growing economic and demographic gap between both shores of the Mediterranean results in large migratory pressure from North Africa to Europe. The constant instability and political conflicts in the region affect Europe’s security but cannot be considered a threat.

The definitions of viable cooperation policies that take migrants’ rights into consideration, and cooperative dialogue are essential to an excellent migration management. This should not just involve countries of destination, but also countries of origin and transit. An effective migration policy, focusing on values of governance, cooperation and human security, will contribute to bring stability to the region.

Investment in the people is essential for the Southern Mediterranean to achieve its new goals and regain a central place in the international system. Also its capacity to deal with the environmental challenges and to make good use of natural resources will define the way forward in terms of development and future of the region.

The EU stepped up to face the challenges posed by the Arab Spring by adopting a series of instruments. Although it may be considered that no significant steps forward were taken and that the measures adopted may be seen as “more of the same”, the new vision adopted aims to overcome the existing divergences. However,

\textsuperscript{49} T. F. Rodrigues/S. S. Ferreira (2011), 33.
whether it will work or not is something that is still to be seen.